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Abstrak 
Apakah Aksi Bela Islam menunjukkan adanya peta baru Gerakan Politik 
Islam di Indonesia? Apakah Gerakan “Aksi Bela Islam” telah mengubah peta 
gerakan Islam Indonesia ? Apa (atau adakah) dampaknya yang lebih jauh bagi 
demokrasi Indonesia ? Berangkat dari berbagai pertanyaan tersebut, tulisan ini 
menunjukkan bahwa, pertama, fragmentasi otoritas keagamaan telah terjadi paska 
Aksi Bela Islam. NU dan Muhammadiyah bukan lagi pemegang otoritas tunggal 
dalam persoalan agama di Indonesia. Selain adanya fragmentasi otoritas 
keagamaan tulisan ini menyatakan bahwa ABI merupakan sebuah “gerakan protes” 
dan “aksi solidaritas” yang akselerasinya menguat dalam konteks isu domestik, 
yaitu Pemilihan Gubernur Jakarta, yang rentan untuk dapat menjaga isunya dalam 
jangka panjang. Sehingga untuk bisa merubah peta gerakan politik Islam yang kuat 
dibutuhkan sebuah pondasi yang kuat dari para penggagas Aksi Bela Islam 
tersebut.  
Kata Kunci : Aksi Bela Islam, Gerakan Politik Islam, Fragmentasi Otoritas 
Keagamaan. 
Abstract 
Does “Aksi Bela Islam” show a new map of the Islamic Political Movement in 
Indonesia? Has the Movement for "Islamic Defense" changed the map of the 
Indonesian Islamist movement? What (or is there) a further impact on Indonesian 
democracy? Departing from these questions, this paper shows that, first, 
fragmentation of religious authority has occurred after the “Aksi Bela Islam”. NU 
and Muhammadiyah are no longer the sole authority in religious affairs in 
Indonesia. In addition to the fragmentation of religious authorities this article 
states that the ABI is a "protest movement" and "solidarity action" whose 
acceleration is stronger in the context of domestic issues, namely the Governor of 
Jakarta, which is vulnerable to maintaining long-term issues. So to be able to 
change the map of a strong Islamic political movement required a strong 
foundation of the initiators of the “Aksi Bela Islam”. 
Keywords: Islamic Defense Action, Islamic Political Movement, Fragmentation of 
Religious Authorities. 
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Introduction 
Indonesia is a country that has succeeded in transforming the political 
system from authoritarianism to democracy and through a relatively peaceful era 
of democratic transition. This has made the Indonesian state a new democratic 
force of the world that counts. As a Muslim-majority country, Indonesia can be 
called a prime example, if not the only one, that has succeeded in making Islam and 
democracy as two lovebirds that are inseparable from one another. Post-
Reformation the role of Islamic Civil Society by referring to the two largest Islamic 
organizations in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah and NU provides an optimistic picture 
of the role of Muslims in Indonesia's democratization. (Hefner: 2001) Both of these 
organizations actively encourage democratization through democratic electoral 
systems, law enforcement, anti-corruption fatwas, encourage good governance, and 
are active in the development of social life through the establishment of 
educational, health and social facilities. All of them contribute to creating a better 
democratic life (Civil). 
After Hefner's optimism with Islamic Civilization was explained, changes in 
the pattern of Islamic relations and democracy in Indonesia have undergone 
various changes. Martin van Bruinessen, for example, noted that there was a 
conservative turn, namely the shift or reversal of the face of Indonesian Islam in a 
conservative direction (Bruinessen: 2013). There has been a change in Islam in 
Indonesia in the reform era, from friendly Islam (known as "smiling Islam") to 
something we can call Islam "angry". From moderate Islam, progressive, if not 
liberal, becomes conservative Islam. The increase in conservatism also occurred at 
Muhammadiyah, as shown in great detail in the study of Ahmad Najib Burhani. This 
was felt since Din Syamsuddin led this organization, replacing M. Amien Rais and 
Ahmad Syafii Maarif. As a result, for example, the role of progressive young people, 
also generally among women, is increasingly marginalized (Bruinessen: 2013). 
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The fading of Islamic hospitality is also evident from the increasing 
popularity of Sharia-compliant regional regulations. This was among others driven 
by the Preparatory Committee for the Enforcement of Islamic Law (KPPSI) in South 
Sulawesi, which was reviewed by Mujiburrahman (Bruinessen: 2013). Although the 
seeds were planted when Kahar Muzakkar rebelled to establish an Islamic state, 
the movement seemed to gain new momentum thanks to the availability of 
democracy in the Reformation era. Remember, Abdul Azis Kahar, Chief of KPPSI, 
was the son of Kahar Muzakkar who had been a member of the Regional Civil 
Service Council (DPD) for the support of the PPP and the United Nations. And the 
most obvious phenomenon of the rise of Islam "anger" in Indonesia appears in 
Surakarta, Central Java, which is related to the Ngruki Islamic Boarding School, as 
described by Muhammad Wildan (Bruinessen: 2013). According to him, and the 
evidence is quite clear, Islamic radicalism under the leadership of Abu Bakar 
Ba'asyir justifies the use of methods of violence in fighting for the establishment of 
an Islamic state. 
The rare phenomenon that occurred in part of the Indonesian Muslim 
community towards the end of 2016 was the emergence of a series of actions "Bela 
Islam" which succeeded in mobilizing very many Muslims in Jakarta which seemed 
to surprise many observers. Many people's surprise at these actions came up 
against the background of the notion that Indonesian Islam, as often advertised, is a 
tolerant, peaceful and, furthermore, model of Islam that supports the ideals of 
democracy. Why is this movement moving like a snowball that continues to grow 
and get widespread sympathy from the community, or is it a series of actions "Bela 
Islam" (1, 2, 3) that is a sign of the changing picture of Indonesian Muslims. 
As far as the discourse that arises regarding the "Bela Islam" Movement is 
triggered by specific accusations about blasphemy by DKI Governor Basuki Tjahya 
Purnama. But along with the broadening of the action participants, the issues that 
emerged have touched many other issues such as the re-emergence of anti-Chinese 
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sentiment, economic and political injustice, to the concerns in the security sector 
with the active radical group cells. One other aspect that demands attention is that 
the movement has had an impact on the regions of Eastern Indonesia where 
Muslims become minorities such as Manado and Kupang with active paramilitary 
groups similar to Jakarta. 
Discourse that arises regarding the dangers of the economy controlled by 
ethnic Chinese migrants scattered on social media and in the community, including 
associated with the DKI Regional Election. At this point, the issue of inequality 
arises inevitably. Economically, ethnic minorities hold a significant portion of the 
national economic cake. The campaign to boycott foreign products, as well as the 
movement to develop economically independently after the "Bela Islam" Action 
movement shows how this unrest is so strongly felt by the community. Concerns 
about the emergence of the strength of the terrorist movement also emerged 
amidst the strengthening of the mobilization of this movement. Sidney Jones briefly 
expressed his analysis before the Islamic Defense Action. The extent to which the 
terrorism movement, which threatens national security, is involved in this latest 
development, and, conversely, is there any influence from the latest development 
(Bela Islam) on strengthening terrorism. 
On the one hand, the "Islamic Action" movement became a hope because it 
was able to encourage and become a government stabilizer, but at a time when 
others were increasingly threatening. The public's enthusiasm for various 
problems, especially in terms of economic, political, and moral degradation, makes 
people look for new alternatives. One of them is the emergence of various Islamic 
political thoughts which later gave birth to many movements. Consolidation at the 
state level continues, but at the same time, there is internal consolidation among 
Muslims. This phenomenon can be read from the emergence of Islamic political 
movements with various actual issues. Enforcement of the Shari'a, Islamic state, 
Islamic caliphate, civil society, and Islamic legal-form movements in political life. 
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From a political point of view, the Islamic Defense Act that occurred was 
clearly not an ordinary demonstration. His presence was more as a social 
movement which was loaded with ideological content, which then sparked 
discourse regarding the rise of the political Islam movement in Indonesia. So that 
this study looks at how to explain the phenomenon of "Islamic Defense", which is 
the success of mobilizing hundreds of thousands, or even claiming millions of 
Muslims around Monas ? This is related to the question of how to name this 
development. Is this an expression of intolerance of a small group of Muslims, a 
new stage that is higher than the series of expressions and manifestations of 
intolerance that some of ABI's central organizations have been supporting for the 
past 15 years? But then how to explain the seemingly widespread support, as 
shown in the Islamic Defense Act, while the organizations did not have many 
previous supporters, especially when compared with the two largest Islamic 
organizations that have existed since the last 100 years in Indonesia, 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama? The next question is, Does the "Action of 
Islamic Defense" Movement change the map of the Indonesian Islamic movement ? 
What (or is there) a further impact on Indonesian democracy ? 
Defining "Aksi Bela Islam" I, II and III 
Massive demonstrations on October 14, 2016, November 4, 2016 and 
December 2, 2016 conducted by a number of elements of the Islamic movement 
can be defined at least based on two epistemological grounds. The first foundation 
is a structural-functional paradigm such as in the writings of Charles J. Chaplin and 
Hei Wei Wang and other articles in an online Asian study journal, New Mandala. 
This paradigm departs from the view of modern social science which views society, 
with its ideology, political actions, and social actions which are essentially (fixed) 
which have certain functions in the macro structure (in this context, the state). 
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The first (modern) view in defining this "Islamic Defense Action", uses a lot 
of social movement theory pioneered by Charles Tilly and his students. For them, 
social movements occur if they fulfill several main elements, namely the existence 
of political entrepreneurs who have strong authority to offer ideas and appeal to 
the community; resource mobilization that can mobilize people from various 
sources (regions, mass organizations, and primordial ties); frame that makes 
attention focused on one goal only; and a political position where social movements 
occupy a thin slice between the state and society. 
Unlike the movement (or political party) that wants to be in power, social 
movements are not involved in official politics (although it does involve political 
actors) but only want to influence power. If so, GNPF-MUI officials are included in 
the category of political entrepreneurs (mockingly, a Driyarkara STF lecturer, 
Herry B. Priyono, in his column in Kompas last January translated political 
entrepreneurs as "Political Breeders") (Priyono: 2017). With their authority, they 
mobilized resources in the form of mobilizing masses of action from various parts 
of Indonesia, with a frame that directed the spotlight on the blasphemy of religion 
by Ahok. The goal of GNPF, in this paradigm, is to take a bargaining position before 
the government so that its political steps are taken into account. 
Adherents of this paradigm will assume that this is something normal in a 
liberal democratic country, which assumes that humans (and society) have the 
same rationality when dealing with problems. Efforts to answer the problem 
rationally, in this paradigm, will deliver the community to a more advanced and 
modern state. Against the Action of Islamic Defense, they "at best" only condemn 
the arguments of the participants of the action, which in their measure are far from 
rational because it brings the issue of religion to the center of social life, opposes 
kafir leaders, and so on. As a recommendation to fellow researchers and policy 
makers, they usually offer the application of ideas of liberalism, pluralism, and the 
like, as an effort to "rationalize" society. 
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At the global level, especially in the Middle East context, studies like this 
have produced a book of research collections entitled Islamic Activism: A Social 
Movement Theory Approach edited by Quintan Wicktorowick, published in 2007. 
The book is the first book to apply social movement theory in the Islamic world . 
Previously, the theory was more often used to study the marxist and anarchist 
movements in North America and Europe. In the book, researchers examine Islamic 
movements of Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, Egypt, and Libya. They found certain patterns in these movements, such as the 
emergence of charismatic figures, mass mobilization for Friday prayers (called 
"Political Friday"), the issue of the existence of a Jewish-US conspiracy in the lives 
of the people, the destruction of moral authority , etc. One of the most interesting 
findings and recommendations of the book is their prediction of a bloody 
democratic transition in the Middle East, and it was proven several years later. 
This, for them, was due to the inequality between the old ideologies and the 
younger and more liberal "reformers". 
The second foundation is the posmarxis paradigm as seen in the book Vedi 
R. Hadiz (2016) entitled Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East 
published by Cambridge University Press. This paradigm departs from the 
postmodern view of social science which views society as a collection of contingent 
individuals (can exist, can be absent) so that it does not have an essence that 
continues (continuously). Community events, in this paradigm, are actions that are 
not essential (essentialist), even in fact not meaningful at all. It is only considered 
meaningful because there is a certain power that surrounds it and has an interest in 
perpetuating it into a "populism". 
This second view, namely posmarxis long before the Islamic Defense Act 
was held, Vedi R. Hadiz has written a book "Islamic Populism", which examines a 
new phenomenon called "populism" in the Indonesian, Turkish and Egyptian 
Islamic communities. The basic idea of populism is the conditioning of society in a 
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majoritarianism mentality, in which the majority are depicted as oppressed and 
threatened by their power outside. Majoritarianism itself is actually something that 
is invented, not essential. Populism was originally a theory of political philosopher 
Ernesto Laclau, a Marxist who witnessed firsthand how the Marxist movements in 
Europe were demoralized, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union. By 
taking several postmodernist theses, Laclau reformulated Marxist thought. 
For Laclau, the biggest obstacle to the marchist articulation is their 
stuttering in managing common issues and seizing discourse in the community. If 
you want to succeed, for Laclau, social activists must be able to seize empty spaces 
called "politics", "democracy" and "society" itself. Why is it called empty space? 
Because these concepts, and even any concept in this world, in a postmodern view 
is a meaningless emptiness. What is called meaning, discourse, and language in a 
concept is actually determined by the holder of power. To win politics, Laclau 
suggests that Marxists no longer get trapped in essentialist views such as hostile 
"bourgeois" and "proletariat", and will deterministically lead to the dictatorship of 
the proletariat as imagined by Karl Marx. 
In the context of the Islamic Defense Act, for Hadiz in a discussion in the 
Tempo office, the main figures of the GNPF succeeded in forming a majoritarianism 
called "Muslims" who were described as dealing with infidels, communists and the 
like. From there a hardened identity is formed, even though it was initially liquid. 
The hardened identity immediately draws distance between "us" and "them". In 
this reading, what is called "Muslims" is actually an empty marker, which can be 
filled by anyone who has an Islamic ID card, but this empty identity is filled by 
majoritarianism formed by GNPF. In fact, there are many Muslims who do not feel 
represented by the GNPF and the mass Action of the Islamic Community, because of 
certain differences (schools, political choices, etc.). 
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What is the purpose of this reading ? In addition to showing the identity 
populism of "Muslims" who are actually vulnerable to melting, the posmarxis 
paradigm also wants to show the power relations within it. They associate 
populism with the oligarchy, where there is a collection of demagogues, financiers 
and political players who condition the majoritarianism to establish their position 
and interests. This is what makes the researchers paradigmatic in linking Islamic 
Action with the interests of SBY, Prabowo, Tommy Suharto, and so on who are 
dealing with a new bourgeoisie behind Ahok. 
Analysis of the two views explicitly shows two different thinking bases, but 
one thing is certain from the massive demonstration on October 14, 2016, 
November 4, 2016 and December 2, 2016 conducted by a number of elements of 
the Islamic movement further confirms the assessment that Islam sectarian politics 
is the dominant face of political Islam today. The combination of various political 
expressions, ranging from puritan ethno-religious sentiments to sectarian-racist 
sentiments, political disillusionment, elite patronage politics, to class expression, 
mixed into one and difficult to distinguish from one another. 
Weakening of the Religious Authority (Fragmentation of Religious Authority) 
Like Sunni Islam in many Islamic countries, Indonesia actually does not 
recognize a single authority. Islamic authority in Indonesia spreads in various 
layers, both in religious institutions, state institutions, and local figures. Religious 
institutions such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Persis have fatwa 
institutions to guide their people in various religious matters. Likewise the 
Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) through the Fatwa Commission regularly issues a 
number of fatwas. 
The existence of various fatwa institutions is actually evidence of the 
pluralism of understanding and interpretation of Islam in Indonesia. Among the 
fatwa institutions, their opinions cannot deny or abolish one another. The diversity 
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of opinions of fatwa institutions is no more than a diversity of legal opinions that 
give people room to choose. The truth of a legal fatwa does not solely lie in 
accuracy in terms of conformity with the arguments of texts (manqūl), but how far 
the fatwa can provide fair moral guidance for the community to solve the problems 
he faces. Therefore, the fatwa from the manqūl side is correct, not necessarily that 
he finds relevance to be followed in real life. 
Among the fatwa institutions in Indonesia, the MUI can be said to be an 
important fatwa institution. Not only because the MUI was formed by the new 
order government, but because later there were attempts to make the MUI fatwa a 
part of the legislative process. There have been attempts to make the MUI fatwa a 
positive law. In addition, several MUI fatwas often lead to controversy and are 
legitimized by certain groups of violence. The MUI seems to be the holder of the 
highest religious authority in Indonesia. 
Rizieq Syihab is a name that is a new center of religious authority after the 
Islamic Defense Act. The fame of Rizieq Syihab was due to his success in initiating 
the National Movement for the Defense of the Indonesian Ulama 'Fatwa Council 
(GNPF-MUI). But there are things that need to be seen from the period of its 
development, the MUI experienced changes that led to an attitude of conservatism 
(Ichwan: 2005). If previously (the New Order era) was more as a "servant of the 
ruler," since the 6th congress in 2000, the MUI defined itself as a "servant of the 
interests of the people". The question is, can the tasks and service functions of the 
people be run by the MUI? Whether the fatwas issued by the MUI have provided a 
solution to the problems experienced by the people, or whether it is part of the 
problem. 
On the other hand, MUI membership which consists of Islamic 
organizations, not individuals, is also quite problematic. Because each member has 
the same number of envoys and the same vote, so even though the NU and 
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Muhammadiyah have the largest number of members, they have the same voting 
weight as mass organizations with a small number of members. In other words, 
even though the NU and Muhammadiyah people have a moderate view, but because 
the vote weight is the same as that of small organizations that think extremically, 
there are extreme fatwas issued. 
The 7th MUI National Conference became a very important momentum. This 
event can be said as a forum to affirm the MUI's attitude towards issues that are 
considered "threatening the purity of Islam". The MUI issued 11 fatwas, some of 
which triggered controversy. The fatwa reasons are: (1) haram violation of 
intellectual property rights; (2) haram shamanism and forecasting; (3) unlawful 
prayer between religions, except prayer according to their respective beliefs. 
Muslims can only practice prayers led by Muslims. Collective prayer between 
religions is considered a heresy and is not taught in Islamic sharia; (4) unlawful 
interfaith marriage; (5) unlawful inheritance, except with wills and grants; (6) MUI 
has the authority to issue criteria of benefit or goodness for the people; (7) MUI 
prohibits pluralism (views that equate all religions), secularism, and liberalism; (8) 
private property rights must be protected by the state, and there is no right for the 
state to seize even reduce it. But if it collides with the public interest, it is generally 
prioritized; (9) Ahmadiyah is a cult and is outside of Islam. Ahmadiyah followers 
are apostates; (10) illegitimate women become prayers as long as there are men 
who are aqil-balig; (11) MUI allows capital punishment for serious crimes (Rumadi, 
2012: 46). 
The explanation above gives a little description of the MUI fatwa issued by 
the MUI Fatwa Council, which states that Ahok has committed blasphemy against 
Islam. The Islamic Defense Act I, II, and III conducted on October 14, 2016, 
November 4, 2016 and December 2, 2016 were critical events to see religious 
developments in Indonesia. One of them relates to fragmentation of religious 
authority (fragmentation or fragmentation of religious authority). Fragmentation of 
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religious authority occurs in Muslims in Indonesia. If previously NU, 
Muhammadiyah and the MUI were national religious authorities, new figures and 
institutions were emerging outside NU and Muhammadiyah. Rizieq Syihab is a 
name that is a new center of religious authority after the Islamic Defense Act. 
This can be seen from the suggestion from Said Agil Siradj, General 
Chairperson of the PBNU (the Nahdlatul Ulama Executive Board), who was ignored 
by some NU residents. Siradj advised NU residents not to join the Islamic Defense 
Act III and NU issued a fatwa that Friday prayers on the highway were illegal. 
Instead of following this recommendation, some pesantren in West Java such as 
Ciamis and Tasikmalaya actually sent their students to go to Monas on foot. Of 
course the normalized affiliation of the pesantren needs to be seen again. However, 
it cannot be denied that many of the NU residents have joined or supported the 
Bela Islam 212 Action. 
What happened in NU also happened at Muhammadiyah. The suggestion of 
Haedar Nashir, General Chairperson of Muhammadiyah PP, to the citizens not to 
take action like fell on deaf ears, was ignored by Muhammadiyah members. Instead 
of following the recommendations of the general chairman, many NU and 
Muhammadiyah residents chose to join Rizieq Syihab, Abdullah Gymnastiar, Arifin 
Ilham, Bachtiar Nasir, and Zaitun Rasmin to take action centrally at the Monas 
Monument (National Monument) Jakarta. 
NU and Muhammadiyah which have often been seen as two main wings or 
representations of Islam in Indonesia. But in the Action of Islamic Defense I, II, and 
III, the two wings are like not functioning, either as a representation of Indonesian 
Islam or as a balancing between radicalism and liberalism. There are other colors of 
Islam that have not been overlooked or tend to be ignored or even seen as parasites 
that actually appear. 
MADANI Jurnal Politik dan Sosial Kemasyarakatan 
Vol 10 No. 1 2018 (12-33) ISSN 2085-143X 
 
 
24 
 
Although some participants rejected Rizieq Syihab's leadership and role in 
Actions 411 and 212, it cannot be denied that Syihab continued to build his 
authority and credibility as a Muslim leader from the incident. And since the 
incident there has been a growing presence of new religious authority outside of 
NU and Muhammadiyah which is heard by Indonesian Muslims. In addition to the 
instructions of Haedar Nashir and Said Agil Siradj which were not considered by 
the people, the shift of religious authority or the change in the map of religious 
authority in Indonesia can be seen in the case that afflicted several Indonesian 
Muslim scholars; Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Ahmad Mustofa Bisri and Muhammad 
Quraish Shihab. 
The Muslim scholars are trying to criticize the attitude of Muslims in 
addressing the Ahok case. Instead of being listened to, they are cursed and bullied 
in various places, especially on social media. If Rizieq Syihab who attacks Ahok 
continues to be praised, the Muslim scholars who try to criticize the attitude 
continue to be criticized. Of course the presence of Rizieq Syihab cannot be said to 
shift or rival the role of NU and Muhammadiyah in Indonesia. Although Syihab has 
developed activities from the FPI not only in sweeping and attacking bars and 
discotheques, but also in humanitarian and economic actions, what they have done 
cannot be compared to the activities of NU and Muhammadiyah in education and 
health. Its presence is only at the limit of providing alternatives and challenges to 
the issue of authority talking about religious issues. This then became a serious 
challenge for NU and Muhammadiyah. 
The weakening of religious authority is also strongly influenced by the 
information and communication technology revolution, especially with the 
existence of the internet and social media, people can easily learn and seek 
information related to religious issues. Information that was previously only 
accessible through books or by studying at pesantren, can now be easily asked by 
Habib Google. This information technology also provides an opportunity for 
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someone to become a mufti or cleric or cleric without having to study religion for 
decades. This condition has in fact theoretically demonstrated the fragmentation of 
religious authority, not only in Indonesia, but throughout the world and throughout 
religious traditions. 
Finally, NU and Muhammadiyah will of course still be a representation of 
Indonesian Islam in the years to come. But the Islamic map in Indonesia can no 
longer be reduced or represented by the two organizations. There is another color 
of Islam as represented by the FPI which in this case tried to ride on the MUI's 
Fatwa which continued to grow and became a challenger to the existence of the two 
oldest and largest mass organizations. 
MUI as part of the state that functions to issue fatwas on Islam, should be 
able to maintain its independence from various pressures of radical and political-
minded Islamic groups. Although the community will not be so concerned with 
these fatwas, but in the context of national life and the state of the fatwas it is 
disturbing, it does not even rule out that the fatwa will have a worse impact, 
especially in the context of interfaith relations. Religion also becomes very shallow. 
This proves that the problem of religious life in Indonesia is not in society, but in 
religious elites. 
At this level, religion is often politicized for certain interests, and is always 
placed in the context of competition from one religion to another. This marks two 
things at once. On the one hand this can be read as a sign that MUI is becoming a 
more "toothed" religious institution, and on the other hand this is also a sign of the 
strengthening of fundamentalist groups through the birth of religious institutions 
initiated by the New Order government. The MUI, both central and regional, again 
shows itself as the most authoritative force to determine whether or not a group 
and religious sect are misguided. 
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Will the “Aksi Bela Islam” Change the Map of Islamic Political Movements in 
Indonesia? 
Islamic Defense Action is a solidarity-based protest movement glued by an 
issue of blasphemy and, in other contexts, the Election of the Governor of DKI 
Jakarta. Many Muslim figures were present at ABI who had large numbers of 
worshipers, but they had a pattern of da'wah that was different from one another 
and brought the topics of the lecture which were also not the same. Some Muslim 
leaders or community leaders and leaders of the Majlis Taklim, such as Abdullah 
Gymnastiar ("Aa Gym") the leader of Daarut Tauhid Islamic Boarding School in 
Bandung, Muhammad Arifin Inspector of Majlis Zikir Az-Zikra, Habib Rizieq Shihah 
FPI High Priest, Bachtiar Nasir GNPF Chairman Secretary General of the Indonesian 
Young Intellectual and Ulema Council (MIUMI), Kyai Ma'ruf Amin Chairperson of 
the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), and figures from other Islamic organizations 
that have many congregations are able to sit together in ABI to raise common 
issues : protest over the blasphemy problem. Not a few local Islamic leaders from 
various regions, especially from satellite cities in West Java, and other large cities 
were present to provide support to the Islamic Defense Action. 
If we look further, there is a character of the da'wah model that is different 
from each of the Islamic figures mentioned above, at least those that often appear 
are reported on television or media. Aa Gym is a muballigh who is very well known 
for her hospitality. His style of lecture is soft and humorous and inspiring for young 
people and families. Da'wah Aa Gym has a characteristic theme that is related to the 
drive to build morals for the younger generation. He rarely speaks politically, and 
especially those related to direct elections. Correspondingly, Bachtiar Nasir who is 
also Secretary General of the Indonesian Young Intellectual and Ulema Council 
(MIUMI) in his daily activities is more spent on the activities of da'wah in the 
campus and some private television stations (with the Tahfidz Al-Qur'an theme). 
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Meanwhile, Muhammad Arifin Ilham as chairman of the Dhikr Council had a 
specific dakwah theme, which encouraged the increase of Muslim spirituality and 
religious awareness through remembrance. In certain contexts, Arifin's inspired 
teaching model resembles or approaches suluk or tasawuf style. Likewise Kyai 
Ma'ruf Amin who represented the MUI, was very rarely involved in movements 
involving mass action. As chairman of the MUI, Kyai Ma'ruf Amin who is also the 
chairman of the Rais ‘Aam Nahdlatul Ulama's Main Board, has strong connections 
and relations to communicate with the authorities government, including the 
President. when voicing aspirations. 
On the other hand, large Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdlatul Ulama tried to keep their distance from ABI. These two organizations did 
not give a clear statement on the position of ABI or about blasphemy. Both also 
asked cadres and residents not to carry organizational attributes if they were 
involved in ABI activities. Because, behind the public appearance of the two 
organizations, there is a long debate whether ABI is a protest movement solely on 
the statement of Ahok (Candidate for Governor of DKI), or indeed it is politically 
driven solely to tackle Ahok's nomination. 
The involvement of many Islamic elements and mass organizations in ABI 
invited several questions, whether the cohesiveness of the organizations in the ABI 
movement can last a long time or is it vulnerable to "melt" after "freezing" in a 
demonstration? 
For certain Islamic movements, as noted by Kumar (2012: 22-23), since the 
beginning of the 20th century, there emerged a political movement aimed at 
restoring Islamic supremacy from the scourge of colonialism spearheaded by 
Muslim figures such as Hasan Al-Bana and Abul Ala Al Maududi. This movement 
which we later came to know as Political Islam has long been in the archipelago, 
being part of what we now understand as Nusantara Islam itself and we can see 
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them in today's demonstration as one of the dominant forces. Appealing to the 
variant of the Islamic movement to "not use Islam for politics" is the same as calling 
on "do not use oxygen to breathe." 
What is worrying about the rise of the Islamic movement, with Political 
Islam as one of its exponents, in Indonesia today is that it is present in the midst of 
a vacuum of class-based political power and an increasingly crazy economic neo-
liberalization. Especially in a city like Jakarta. Berman and Rose, explained that 
economic neoliberalization which brings excesses to the harsh daily life of urban 
society, ultimately creates an ideal environment that creates religious solidarity 
and communal identity. Industrial acceleration that has taken place since the New 
Order created a large lumpen proletariat. They are, as part of a Muslim society that 
has long been oppressed and exploited economically by a secular government, 
which is then accommodated by its populist aspirations and complaints by the 
Islamic movement (Hadiz, 2016: 43). 
Plus the fight against terrorism at the global level, the two contexts above 
have shaped our (negative) perceptions of Islam Politics. Moreover, political Islam 
is expressed on the streets. There are many unhealthy prejudices launched against 
the Islamist movement. One of the most frequently mentioned on social media is 
that this movement does not fit into the archipelago ecosystem and must be exiled 
to the Middle East. This is the same opinion as the ultra-right racist group Golden 
Dawn in Greece, which considers all violence to be Arab and must be returned to 
Arabia. There is also a condescending prejudice that considers every mass action of 
Political Islam to be a crowd of unemployed who expect packaged rice. 
First, this kind of prejudice has diverted attention from the real culprit of 
unemployment, namely capitalism. It is as if the Islamist movement has been 
responsible for increasingly worrying about the unemployment rate, even though 
we are facing a labor regime that believes in labor flexibility. 
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Secondly, by demeaning the masses of the Islamist movement as a mass that 
is only motivated by rewards, we will not be able to understand their political 
perspectives and their contradictions. There will be no discussion that can take 
place democratically and mature if this prejudice continues to be maintained. 
Many are actually more opposed to mass action than political Islam. After 
the first wave of the Islamic movement on October 14, 2016, social media noisy for 
days about damaged parks around the National Monument. This noise is not as 
substantive as fussing over a pile of garbage near the State Palace after the Labor 
Day demonstration. Some people who were concerned about the damaged parks 
near Monas were silent people when mining companies damaged the Kendeng 
mountains and cheered when our brothers in Papua were brutally murdered on 
behalf of the Republic of Indonesia. 
Even though like it or not, Political Islam has been a part of the archipelago's 
political thinking for a long time. If indeed we are ready to accept Political Islam as 
part of the repertoire of political thought in Indonesia, then we need to provide 
radical criticism of the contradictions of the Islamist movement. Deradicalization 
which is often used by both countries and non-state groups as a strategy to stem 
the Islamist movement is not the right strategy. Why do you de-radicalize the 
Islamist movement which is not radical at all? Radical means rooted, so acting 
radically means acting based on deep understanding. 
Spouting racism shamelessly and selling out unbelieving accusations, like 
the Islamist movement like the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), does not reflect an 
action that departs from deep understanding. We are seeing a confused Islamic 
movement. They held a massive action because of accusations of defamation that 
was less convincing with video snippets from Facebook. Some groups that reject 
liberal democracy as an infidel product are eager to go on the road to electoral 
moments like now. This signifies the reactionary character of those who have no 
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clear agenda. They urged Ahok to be arrested by Indonesian police and processed 
by Indonesian law. 
That is, indirectly the Islamist movement recognizes their submission to the 
Indonesian police and law which on several occasions they call the taghut system. 
Later many Islamists called for absurd slogans such as "Indonesian Republic of 
Indonesia" and some other Islamists allied politically with Ahmad Dhani's celebrity 
who was full of obscene entertainment. We are not facing a radical Islamist 
movement, we are facing a shallow and confused Islamic movement. 
Besides that, with a very diverse background and characteristics of Islamic 
organizations that are in ABI, it is a challenge for ABI to maintain its cohesiveness, 
especially after the demonstration of political issues is increasingly wildly colored 
between the pros and cons of ABI, or rather the pros and cons between supporters 
and Ahok's political enemy. As a solidarity movement, the power of the issue is the 
key to maintaining cohesiveness between different groups to stay in line and 
transform the energy they have to make the desired changes. That is, if ABI is only 
intended or only to target Ahok to be imprisoned so that he cannot lead DKI 
Jakarta, then it is clear that ABI can be categorized as a protest movement. In this 
context, it might be possible to quote Asef Bayat's statement about the 
characteristics of the protest movement: 
"... protest movements, which may culminate in insurrections, are 
usually transitory and do not last long. They either achive their goal or 
are suppressed. Since they directly challenge the political authority, the 
most critical element of protest movement is sustainability. "(Bayat, 
2007: 19) 
Therefore, after ABI 3, existing groups returned to their respective habitats 
and re-carried out social activism-da'wah as unique characteristics possessed by 
each group. A sense of solidarity that had strengthened to be able to unite steps 
might still exist in each group, but maintaining the sustainability of the Islamic 
movement in accordance with the model of da'wah owned by each group became 
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more important. The reason is that, as a movement, Islamic organizations have a 
longer future and a wider and lasting (a longer time span) public relations project, 
while a solidarity-based protest movement is only for the short term (a short life -
span). 
Conclusion 
The final episode towards the end of 2016 saw a series of "Bela Islam" 
actions which successfully mobilized very many Muslims in Jakarta. There was a lot 
of suspicion and support from various groups related to the action, both optimism 
and pessimism each had their arguments and interests held by the researchers. So 
that in this short study the writer cannot conclude the Action of Islamic Defense 
and can only provide a final note from the observations of the author. 
First, as a social movement of Islamic articulation of Muslims that is 
packaged through the Action of Islamic Defenders becomes a forerunner to foster a 
strong tradition of civil society. This is important, considering that civil society is a 
condition for the establishment of democracy. He boils down to the need for 
strengthening the community (citizens) to balance, as well as being able to control 
the policies of a distorted country and tend to position citizens as weak subjects. 
Second, with the information and communication technology revolution, 
especially with the existence of the internet and social media, people can easily 
learn and seek information related to religious issues. This information technology 
also provides an opportunity for someone to become a mufti or cleric or cleric 
without having to study religion for decades. This condition has in fact theoretically 
demonstrated the fragmentation of religious authority, not only in Indonesia, but 
throughout the world and throughout religious traditions. NU and Muhammadiyah 
will of course still be a representation of Indonesian Islam in the years to come. But 
the Islamic map in Indonesia can no longer be reduced or represented by the two 
organizations. There is another color of Islam as represented by the FPI which 
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continues to grow and become a challenger to the existence of the two oldest and 
largest mass organizations. 
Third, in addition to building the spirit of solidarity, articulation of political 
Islam is primarily aimed at developing the capacity and awareness of the wider 
community. This is mainly related to issues of justice in economic equality. After 
the Islamic Defense Act, these symptoms appear from the emergence of a unifying 
movement of all the economic forces of the Muslim Ummah which is intended to 
encourage a more equitable national economic governance. 
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